What breaks it
Deleting the selector record, replacing the nameservers without copying it, or a mail provider that rotates keys and expects a new record you never published. The message then fails DKIM verification, which matters most when DMARC relies on DKIM alignment.
How it fits with SPF and DMARC
SPF says which servers may send. DKIM proves the content is intact and signed by the domain. DMARC combines the results and tells receivers what to do when they fail. A domain usually needs all three.
An example
default._domainkey.example.com. TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkq..." is a DKIM selector record named default. The sending service signs each message with the matching private key and adds a DKIM-Signature header that names d=example.com; s=default. Run dig TXT default._domainkey.example.com +short to test: an empty answer means the record is missing, and mail signed with that selector fails verification. A provider that rotates keys may ask for a new selector name, so publish every selector it gives you.
DKIM does not say a message is wanted, only that it was signed by the domain it names; a spammer can sign messages with their own domain. That is why DMARC checks that the signing domain aligns with the visible From address.
What to check
That each sending service has its selector record in DNS, and the Authentication-Results header of a test message shows dkim=pass.
Sources
Read on . Standards and vendor pages change; confirm the current text before you rely on it.
- RFC 6376, DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures (www.rfc-editor.org)